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Abstract
In this paper we investigate menta1-representation strategies applied to solve contextua1
problerns that involve mathematica1 ca1culus. We are interested in forma1 procedures. algorithrns.
and strategies that could be used by three groups of peoples: with specific mathematica1
knowledge (the expert group); without this knowledge (the control group); and without this
specific knowledge but acquainted with the designed problem context (the familiar group ).
Our investigation demonstrates that the reasoning developments of these three groups are
quite different from one to another: in the expert group the reasoning is only based on a1gorithmic
operations; in the control group the reasoning combines a1gorithm with other mathematical
strategies; and the familiar group uses a more intuitive reasoning. probably int1uenced by their
familiarity with the problem context and by their special mental strategies.
In this research we aim to come through with Cognitive Science studies on the nature of
human knowledge. Mathematical problem resolutions in general and arithmetic ca1culus in
particular are tools very interesting to recognize the difference between expert and beginner
knowledge and reasoning.
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Introduction
We are interested in educationa1 approaches involving problem solving and
epistemologica1 strategies. Our actua1 researches concern cognitive aspects on mental
representations occurring in mathematica1 operations. In this paper we describe some theoretica1
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paradigrns supporting the experimenta1 too1s we have applied to our last experiment concerning
mathematical reasoning on arithrnetic.
We discuss about cognitive aspects associated with this experiment. This research is
based on (Carraher, Schliemann and Carraher, 1995) and on some results obtained by (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1983). In this paper we a1so take in account the abstract rules theories (Braine,
1978) and the modal theories (Eysenck and Keane, 1994)
For instance, the abstract rules theories apply a set of rules -as in lambda ca1culus- in
order to obtain deductive inferences; the modal theories use the syllogistic reasoning. Some
researches performed by (Gentner and Stevens, 1983) and (Johnson-Laird, 1983) point out an
interesting theoretica1 direction with regards to problem solving abilities and reasoning.
Sternberg's results (Sternberg, 1982) shows the interdependency between intelligence, reasoning
and problem solving .
The deftnition of intelligence, for instance, is fundarnenta11y based on the roles assumed
by the reasoning and problem solving involved in hurnan strategies present in globa1 processes of
rea1 problem resolution (Mayer, 1983), (Johnson-Laird, 1983, (Anderson, 1978), (Roy d' Andrade
1982), (Tverskyand Kahneman, 1983), (Kahnernan and Tversky, 1982).
The Experiment
Our experirnent has as centra1 goa1 to know about all conditions that could facilitate the
mathematica1 reasoning, specially the arithrnetic one. In our recent researches we have tried to
demonstrate how humans without a mathematica1 formation and training can solve mathematical
problerns correctly. Our central goa1 is to verify if the strategies applied by these peoples are very
different from those applied by peoples having a more specific formation, which genera11y apply
forrna1 procedures properly.
Our hypotheses are:
~ Peoples with a specific forrna1 training in mathematics -specialist group, which could use
only formal procedures in order to solve any mathematical problem;
~ Peoples without a specific forrna1 training in mathematics -control group, which could not
use forrna1 procedures in order to solve a mathematica1 problem;
~ Peoples with a specific forrna1 education in mathematics -familiar group, which could have
some familiarity with inductive reasoning from data of the problem to be solved;
~ If a11 peoples involved in the experiment sometimes use forrna1 procedures and sometimes
use others strategies, then we could afflfm that formal procedures are not the dorninant in the
menta1 representation of a problem. This means that there are additiona1 strategies
inf1uencing the solving approach.
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Methods
We have used eight problems whose respective contexts are inserted in rea1 situations.
Solving these problems require cognitive strategies based on arithmetica1 ca1culus. We grouped
the peoples in three sets, each one with ten peoples. The proposed problems have been solved
using pencil and paper associated with a synchronous ora1 explanation about the strategy being
used in al1 steps of the resolution process (thinking aloud strategy).
The issues from each people and the ones from each group were comparatively ana1yzed.
The irnrnediate consequence of this method is the possibility of to obtain a profl1e of the menta1
representations that are frequently elaborated by peoples solving mathematica1 problems. We
have ana1yzed the oral and the written protocols in a synchronous way. We have seen that in
forrna1 reasoning there is a predorninance of ca1culus based on arithmetic operations or then
based on concepts concemed to specific mathematica1 contexts. In the altemative reasoning
predorninates the use of arithmetica1 operations associated with others strategies -denoted
auxiliaries- such as those proportioned by rules that are frequently applied to inductive
reasoning.
These strategies can cal1 'irnages' from severa1 solutions based on intellectua1 intuitions
without the required "cognitive way" (such as formulas, rules, mathematica1 concepts etc.)
previously estab1ished.
Results
By using the Test(t) Student Method we have ana1yzed the correct results and the wrong
ones. It was confIrmed a difference from more 1% of correct results than wrong results. This fact
means that the cognitive strategies used in the associated problem resolutions, a1though been
diversi:fied, were quite well applied to. The comparative ana1ysis of the three groups and the three
kinds of reasoning by Ducan ' s Amplitude Test has confirmed that the formal reasoning is
predorninant (1 %) in the specialist group over both the control group and the fami1iarity group
(such as we have supposed in our hypotheses).
There is predorninance of the a1ternative reasoning ( 1% ) in the fami1iarity group over both
control group and the specia1ist group (obeying our hypotheses). It was a1so found a significant
predorninance (1% ) of the inductive reasoning in the farni1iarity group with regards to both the
control group and the specia1ist group (obeying our hypotheses).
Conclusions and Perspectives
The globa1 ana1ysis of the obtained results has confIrmed that correct resu1ts are more
significant than the wrong ones. This means that the cognition strategies used in a problem
solving process are generally well uti1ized. The resu1ts concerning the kinds of reasoning have
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confirmed that it is significantly superior the predominance of formal reasoning in both the
specia1ists group and the familiarity group.
This last result points out to the need of future researches. The development of forma1
reasoning in rea1 application is done in a natura1 way, but the scholar leveI a1so influences it. We
could admit too that the scholar leveI influences in severa1 ways, but under some contexts the
familiarity with certain tasks could produce more efficiency. It is important to note that
university' s students that used predorninately the a1ternative reasoning, applying genera1
strategies, cornposed the control group.
We could assume that the results obtained in our research are the basis to future
researches we are actual1y developing. In particular we are interested in peculiar characteristics
of the familiarity group behavior. We are especially interested in the investigation about menta1
representation proprieties, which are more predorninant in this group.
We want a1so investigate about menta1 representation involving the rnain kinds of
mathematical skills. An irnportant issue of this research could be to know how the hurnans could
participate of a more genera1 mathematicallearning process.
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